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Abstract—Hanabi is a cooperative game that brings the
problem of modeling other players to the forefront. In this
game, coordinated groups of players can leverage pre-established
conventions to great effect, but playing in an ad-hoc setting
requires agents to adapt to its partner’s strategies with no
previous coordination. Evaluating an agent in this setting requires
a diverse population of potential partners, but so far, the
behavioral diversity of agents has not been considered in a
systematic way. This paper proposes Quality Diversity algorithms
as a promising class of algorithms to generate diverse populations
for this purpose, and generates a population of diverse Hanabi
agents using MAP-Elites. We also postulate that agents can
benefit from a diverse population during training and implement
a simple “meta-strategy” for adapting to an agent’s perceived
behavioral niche. We show this meta-strategy can work better
than generalist strategies even outside the population it was
trained with if its partner’s behavioral niche can be correctly
inferred, but in practice a partner’s behavior depends and
interferes with the meta-agent’s own behavior, suggesting an
avenue for future research in characterizing another agent’s
behavior during gameplay.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the problem of generating agents for
ad-hoc cooperation [1] in games. In ad-hoc cooperation, an
agent must be able to achieve high performance in a coopera-
tive task when paired with one or more partners, called ad-hoc
teammates, whose identity is not known prior to the start of
the task, and with no prior coordination of strategies. This type
of problem can model many real-world interactions between
human actors and autonomous artificial agents, such as a driver
navigating a busy street among other vehicles and pedestrians
or a digital assistant giving personalized suggestions to a
human user.
This precludes the agent from taking advantage of assump-
tions and conventions that could be taken for granted in
scenarios where one’s partners are known in advance (which
includes self-play). On the other hand, online modeling of
other agents takes greater importance. A typical challenge in
agent modeling is about predicting the future actions of other
agents, but in environments with asymmetrical information,
it also becomes important to interpret observed actions and
infer what they might imply about hidden features of the
world. In essence, our agents should be able to represent the
distinct mental state of other actors and see the world from
their perspective. This ability has also been referred to as
having a theory of mind [2]. Hanabi is a game that brings
these issues to the forefront due to the unique nature of its
asymmetrical information, where players don’t see their own
cards and communication is heavily restricted. We describe
the game in section II.
Evaluation of agents in an ad-hoc setting typically occurs
by sampling teammates from a pool of potential partners.
However, the choice of which agent to include in this pool,
how to account for the behavioral diversity of these agents
and whether the pool is made public or secret to the designers
of ad-hoc agents has important implications to the generality
and reproducibility of a benchmark or competition. We discuss
these issues, along with other related work, in section III.
Sections IV and V contain the methodology and results of
the first main contribution of this paper: metrics for character-
izing the behavior space of Hanabi agents and a method for
generating diverse, high-quality agents using MAP-Elites [3],
which attempts to fill out each niche of this space with
rule-based agents having as high fitness (given by self-play
performance) as possible.
The remainder of the paper contains our second main
contribution: designing an ad-hoc cooperation “meta-agent”
that leverages the pools of partners generated by MAP-Elites.
We do this by pre-computing a generalist strategy for the
pool as a whole and a specialized strategy for each partner in
the pool, then attempting to estimate a partner’s niche during
gameplay and selecting the action suggested by the appropriate
specialized strategy. We show that this adaptation strategy can
perform better than the generalist strategy if a partner’s niche
can be correctly estimated, but in practice the meta-agent is
unable to accurately estimate the niche, due to what seems to
be an issue of interference between the meta-agent’s behavior
and its partner’s behavior.
This paper is an extension of a previous paper [4] presented
at the 2019 IEEE Conference on Games (CoG). Sections VI
and VII are novel contributions describing the meta-agent
and associated results. The earlier sections include, among
smaller changes, the addition of pseudocode describing the
MAP-Elites algorithm, the definition of a new behavioral
metric (IPP) that doesn’t rely on secret information and a
more detailed discussion about the relevance of techniques
that account for behavioral diversity in the context of ad-hoc
cooperative game AI benchmarks.
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II. HANABI: THE GAME
Hanabi is a cooperative card game designed by Antoine
Bauza and has won the prestigious Spiel des Jahres award for
tabletop games in 2013. It is played by groups of 2-5 players
who try to play stacks of cards in correct order of rank or value
(from 1 to 5) for each of the five colors in the game (B, R, Y,
W and G). Players play with the contents of their hands facing
outwards, so that each player sees the cards every other player
has, but not their own cards. The group can only communicate
through hint actions, which allow the current player to select
another player and point to all cards of a chosen rank or color
in their hand, at the expense of a hint token from a shared
pool. When a card is played to the table, the group scores a
point if it is the next card in its color stack, or loses a life
otherwise. A player can also discard a card from their hand,
which recovers one information token.
The game ends with a victory for the group if all five stacks
are completed with cards ranked 1 to 5 of that color. Whenever
a card is played or discarded, players must draw back to their
hand limit from a draw deck. If the draw deck is exhausted,
every player gets one last turn to take an action, after which
the game ends in defeat if not all stacks are complete. The
game also ends with defeat if the group loses three lives. The
score of the game is the number of cards successfully played
by the group, that is, 25 in case of victory or from 0 to 24 in
case of defeat.
Hints provide grounded information by disclosing the rank
or color of cards. Examples of hints are “your first, second
and fourth card are 1’s”, “your middle card is a 5” and
“your two rightmost cards are yellow”. But in addition to
this grounded layer of meaning, players try to infer additional
implicit meaning from each hint by taking into account a
model of the other player. For example, if the 1’s of some (but
not all) colors have been played, most players who receive a
hint of “your leftmost card is a two” would assume that it
refers to a playable card, even though nothing was said of its
color. The player giving the hint should therefore predict how
the receiving player would act in different scenarios and the
receiving player must in turn interpret what each hint (and
other actions) says about the state of the game.
Over time, conventions can either emerge organically or
be formally agreed to in a group. Conventions provide a
guideline for how hints ought to be interpreted and which hints
should be given in each situation. Examples of conventions
are “hints should, if possible, identify playable cards rather
than unplayable ones” and “players should discard unidentified
cards from oldest to newest”. But these can easily backfire if
all players are not using the same convention. For AI research,
this makes the self-play problem, where all agents are known
to be following the same strategies and conventions, funda-
mentally different from the problem of ad-hoc cooperation.
III. RELATED WORK
A. Hanabi-Playing agents and the CIG/CoG competition
Many of the early approaches [5]–[7] for playing Hanabi
with AI were variations of a simple strategy for self-play
which prioritizes playing cards that are believed to be playable,
followed by giving hints that identify playable cards in other
player’s hands, followed by discarding cards that are believed
to not be necessary. Walton-Rivers et al. [8] re-implemented
many of these agents under a rule-based paradigm, while
addressing the problem of playing with a diverse population
of agents with different strategies in Hanabi.
A rule-based agent is defined by an ordered sequence of
rules. Each rule takes a game state and checks whether a
condition is true. If the condition is true, the rule also specifies
which action to take. Otherwise, the agent moves on to the next
rule in order. Rules can be divided into play rules (e.g. “play
a card estimated to be playable with probability > 60%”),
tell rules (e.g. “give new information about a playable card”)
and discard rules (e.g. “discard the oldest card in hand”). Their
evaluation of an agent was based on that agent’s average score
across all parings with agents from a fixed pool.
The 2019 Hanabi CoG competition [9] is based on this
work. It first took place at the 2018 CIG conference, where
participants submitted agents both for a self-play (or “mirror”)
track and a mixed play track. In the mixed play track, the
agents had to play with a pool similar to the one used
in [8], but the exact agents were not made public before the
competition. The winner of the competition was a variant of
Monte Carlo Tree Search [10] by Goodman [11] designed to
deal with problems of strategy fusion and nonlocality that
arise from executing tree search in a hidden information
environment. They also use neural networks to model a pool
of other sample agents, and bayesian updates keep track of
which agent in this pool best approximates the current partner.
It achieved a score of 13.28 in the mixed track and 20.57 in
the mirror track [12].
Our 2018 competition entry, which took second place, is
described in [13]. We implemented an evolutionary algorithm
to make rule-based agents by searching for a well-performing
sequence of rules both for self-play and mixed play, using the
same pool as [8] for mixed play. It achieved a score of 12.85
in the mixed track and 17.52 in the mirror track. While the
current paper is based on that previous work, here we ignore
the standard pool used in [8] and [13] and procedurally create
our own pool, whose agents are evaluated by how well they
fare on self-play and when paired with each other.
The 2019 competition also featured a mirror and mixed
track, plus a new learning track where agents can adapt to
repeated play with the same partners. While this paper does not
aim directly to develop agents to compete, we hope the pools
of ad-hoc partners we are generating can help in evaluating
future agents, and in better understanding what types of play
work better with agents exhibiting a variety of behaviors.
Other than the CoG competition and its related agents,
another body of work on Hanabi agents focuses on Rein-
forcement Learning (RL) agents, starting with the Hanabi
Learning Environment by Bard et al. [14]. Their Actor Critic
Hanabi Agent (ACHA) introduced in the paper scores over 20
points in self-play, but scores close to zero when paired with
independently trained instances of itself and with a Rainbow
DQN [15] agent. They also propose an ad-hoc setting where
self-play playtraces of the partner agent are provided prior
to gameplay for learning, but to our knowledge there are no
published agents taking advantage of this feature.
The best-performing self-play agents we are aware of is by
Lerer et al. [16]. This is a hybrid agent that combines a pre-
established “blueprint policy” with a public search procedure.
The best version of the agent uses an RL agent called the
Simplified Action Decoder (SAD) [17] as blueprint policy.
SAD achieves an average score in 2-player games of 24.08,
and Lerer’s agent using SAD as blueprint policy achieves an
average score of 24.61.
Both SAD and Lerer’s search procedure benefit greatly from
coordination taking place before the game, and as such are not
expected to perform well in ad-hoc scenarios and have been
noted to learn conventions that arbitrarily map color hints to
playing or discarding a card in specific positions. Conventions
of this type had been previously used in agents based on the
“hat-guessing” paradigm first proposed by Cox et al. [18] and
expanded on by Bouzy [19] and Wu [20], which also achieve
scores over 24 in games with 3 or more players.
Studies involving evaluation with human players in Hanabi
include the rule-based agents by Eger et al. [7] and Liang et
al. [21] inspired by Grice’s maxims [22] and a recent method
for dealing with symmetries of a Dec-POMDP called Other
Play [23], which used SAD as the underlying architecture for
Hanabi play. All of these studies achieve similar mean scores
around 15 with humans.
B. Ad-Hoc Cooperation
Ad-hoc Cooperation is the problem of cooperating with
arbitrary partners, with no prior coordination. We call those
partners ad-hoc teammates (human or AI agents). One of
the earliest formalizations of this problem involving teams of
autonomous artificial agents is by Stone et al. [1].
Their framing of the problem can be stated as such: given a
pool of potential teammates A and a domain of potential tasks
D, create an agent a that maximizes the expected payoff when
asked to perform a randomly sampled task d ∈ D, paired with
a randomly sampled subset of teammates B ⊂ A. Importantly,
B is not known at the start of each individual task. In our case,
the domain D is the set of starting configurations of a game
of 2-player Hanabi, which includes randomizing the choice of
starting player.
An important difference between this formulation and the
Hanabi challenges proposed in [9] and [14] is that in Stone et
al. [1], the pool of potential agents A is assumed to be known
in advance (although it could possibly be infinite), whereas
in [9] and [14] this pool is secret.
Comparing these two formulations, treating A as given
makes the ad-hoc performance of an agent easier to reproduce
and to compare with other agents by simply making a large
enough sample of teammates from A and tasks from D, but
high performance in this settings might come as a result
of over-specialization to the partners in A and might not
generalize to other choices of partners.
On the other hand, treating A as unknown introduces
problems for reproducibility and comparison of performance
with other agents. How could we compare a new agent’s
performance to those of, say the participants of the competition
described in [9] after the paired controllers used in that
competition have been made public? How could we compare
experiments performed with different choices of A? How
could we isolate an agent’s intrinsic adaptation abilities from
its designer’s prior beliefs about the unknown agents in A?
In either formulation of the problem, the designer of the
benchmark ideally wants to avoid a situation where a single
non-adaptive agent plays well with all partners in the pool.
Moreover, if the benchmark is meant to serve as a proxy for
cooperation with humans, it requires some characterization of
the space of human behaviors and a way to make sure A
contains agents representative of this space.
A main contribution of this paper is the proposal of a
method for generating the pool of partners A while explicitly
taking into account both the behavioral diversity and the
quality of the evaluation pool, which addresses many of
these issues. We do this through the use of Quality Diversity
algorithms such as MAP-Elites, which we discuss next.
C. Quality Diversity and MAP-Elites
Quality Diversity [24] (QD) algorithms are a class of
population-based search algorithms that aim to generate a
large number of solutions that are behaviorally diverse and
of high quality. Behaviorally diverse means the agents are
distributed representatively across a behavior space induced
by one or more behavioral metrics. High quality means the
agent performs well according to some fitness function.
Diversity of behavior can be pursued either as desirable
target in its own right or as an intermediate step to high-
quality solutions in deceptive fitness landscapes, as showcased
by novelty search [25]. QD differs from novelty search,
however, because it does not optimize for novelty alone,
but searches for both behavioral diversity and high fitness at
once. QD also differs from Multi-Objective Optimization [26],
which searches for trade-offs between one or more objectives,
because QD actively attempts to find high-quality solutions
in all regions of the behavior space, not just those with good
trade-offs.
MAP-Elites [3] is an example of QD algorithm that attempts
to “illuminate” the behavior space by mapping each individual
to a behavioral “niche”, while maintaining an archive of the
best individual (an elite) in each niche. MAP-Elites was first
proposed to pre-compute a variety of effective gaits for a six-
legged robot, so that, when the robot suffers damage, it can
quickly search for a gait that adapts to the damage and allows
it to keep moving at a decent pace [27].
IV. GENERATING DIVERSE AGENTS WITH MAP-ELITES
Our approach starts with using a QD algorithm such as
MAP-Elites to generate a pool of high-quality, behaviorally
diverse agents. This pool is used as our choice of A in the
formulation described in section III-B and addresses the issues
raised in that section in the following ways:
• The creator of the pool needs to specify only the be-
havioral metrics that characterize a solution and the
optimization method, but not the individual teammates
that go in the pool, potentially reducing human bias in
the selection of these teammates.
• Agents are guaranteed to be diverse with respect to the
chosen behavioral metrics, which minimizes the risk that
a single strategy cooperates well with all of them.
• The choice of behavioral metrics and its induced behavior
space can also help with player modelling: we can ask
where humans fall in a given space or which metrics best
capture differences between individual human players.
• Generating the evaluation pool stochastically with a given
distribution provides a middle ground between the setting
where the complete pool is known in advance (which
might encourage over-specialization) and where the pool
is secret (which brings issues of reproducibility).
We believe our approach is useful both for the individual
researcher, who can use it to create a pool of training partners
in scenarios where the evaluation pool is secret, and to
the larger community when designing new benchmarks and
competitions that are meant to test the ability to cooperate
with a variety of strategies or serve as a proxy for cooperation
with humans.
Below, we describe how MAP-Elites was implemented to
this end. The implementation is available in our public github
repository 1.
A. Definition of the feature space
MAP-Elites requires us to select one or more behavior
metrics that induce a behavior space and serve as coordinates
to locate any agent in that space.
We then need to discretize this space, which defines niches
where all agents have all behavior metrics within a certain
range.
Finally, we use some optimization protocol, such as evolu-
tionary search, to simultaneously search for individuals with
as high fitness as possible within each niche. This is done by
keeping an archive of elites of each niche, representing the
best agent found so far within that niche, then comparing a
newly evaluated candidate’s fitness with the fitness of the elite
in the same niche as the candidate.
We chose the following behavioral metrics as dimensions
of the behavior space in Hanabi:
• Information per Play (IPP): whenever an agent plays
a card, we verify whether it knows its color and/or rank.
Each of these is considered one piece of information. We
count how many pieces of information the agent knows
(either 0, 1 or 2) for each card that is played, then average
this value across all played cards. Finally, we divide by 2
to get a number between 0 and 1. An agent scoring 1 in
this dimension only plays cards that are fully known (both
1https://github.com/rocanaan/Hanabi-Map-Elites
color and rank), whereas an agent scoring zero would
only play cards it knows nothing about.
• Communicativeness: defined as the fraction of time an
agent will choose to give a hint if a hint token available
at the start of the turn. An agent scoring 1 in this
dimension would always give a hint if possible, being
fully communicative, while an agent scoring 0 would
never give any hints.
In [4], we used a metric called Risk Aversion instead of IPP.
It reflected the average probability that a card is playable, from
the perspective of the agent, across all played cards. However,
this probability depends on which cards an agent sees in its
partners’ hands, and this information is not available from
the perspective of each partner. This makes Risk Aversion a
hard metric to estimate for other players with the information
available during gameplay. For this reason, we decided to
replace it with IPP, which depends only on public information.
These dimensions were chosen because they are easy to
measure and we believe that they are strategically meaningful,
requiring different strategies to play with at different points
in the feature space. In particular, both Risk Aversion and
IPP were meant as proxies for a pattern that can be observed
in game-play between humans: inexperienced players usually
only play cards they know everything about (thus having
values of Risk Averion or IPP close to 1), where more
experienced players are more often comfortable playing cards
under partial information as a result of either accounting for
other player’s apparent beliefs and intentions (theory of mind)
or of following a particular pre-established convention.
IPP has the added benefit over Risk Aversion that well-
performing agents with low IPP are theoretically possible, if
the agent is using a convention that often allows a card that
was never pointed at to be played (such as “if I give a hint of
the color Yellow, you should play your second card”), where
a low value of Risk Aversion forces the agent to only play
cards that are known to be very unlikely to be playable.
We suspected that the highest-scoring behavior in self-play
would fall at some value much greater than 0, but lower than 1
for both dimensions: a 0 in either dimension leads to obviously
degenerate play, but good play likely requires playing cards
under some uncertainty (implying IPP and risk aversion < 1)
and sometimes passing up the opportunity to give a hint so
that the other player can better utilize the hint token (implying
Communicativeness < 1).
Note also that while these dimensions help describe an
agent’s play, they don’t completely determine it. Communica-
tiveness does not tell us which hint will be given, only the
likelihood that some hint will be given if a hint token is
available. Similarly, IPP does not tell us whether the agent
will play a card, only how much is known on average about
it given that it was played.
Each metric takes values in the range of [0,1], and we chose
to discretize them at intervals of 0.05, defining 20 intervals in
each dimension of the behavior space, which amounts to a
total of 400 niches.
B. Representation and operators
We use a similar representation of individuals as the one we
used in [13]. Each individual is represented by a chromosome
defined by a sequence of 15 integers, each integer representing
one of 135 possible rules. An agent’s action is determined by
simply moving through the rules in the order they appear in the
chromosome and selecting the action returned by the first rule
that applies. An agent might have rules that never fire during
gameplay (for example, a rule that says “discard a random
card” would never fire if it comes after “discard your oldest
card”). An agent can also have duplicate rules, in which case
the second instance of the rule will never fire (assuming the
rule either fires or not deterministically, which is true for the
rules we are using). Nevertheless, these unused or repeated
rules are part of an agent’s genetic representation and can be
passed on to its offspring. We selected 15 as chromosome
length because our agents from [13] rarely had more than 10
different rules activated.
The first few chromosomes (in our experiments, 104) are
implemented by sampling rules uniformly at random from
the ruleset, while the remaining chromosomes are generated
by mutation and crossover of the elite in a random niche.
Mutation is implemented by randomly replacing each rule
in a chromosome with a random rule with probability 0.1.
Crossover happens with probability 0.5 and is implemented by
selecting another individual from the population and randomly
selecting (with probability 0.5) the corresponding rule from
either parent at each gene.
C. Pseudocode of the MAP-Elites algorithm
With these metrics, representation and operators in mind,
algorithm 1 shows the abstracted pseudocode of the MAP-
Elites algorithm.
Algorithm 1: MAP-Elites
Result: A, an archive with each niche’s elite.
generation← 0;
A← ∅;
while generation < G do
c← newChromossome(A, generation) ;
x← makeAgent(c);
f ← fitness(x);
i, j ← niches(x);
if Ai,j = null then
Ai,j ← c;
else
felite ← fitness(makeAgent(Ei,j)) ;
if f > felite then
Ai,j ← c
In our experiments, the functions newChromosome,
makeAgent, niches are implemented as described below:
If generation < 104, newChromosome returns a list of
15 rules by sampling the rule-set uniformly. Otherwise, the
new chromosome is generated by mutation and crossover of
random parents sampled from A, as described in section IV-B.
makeAgent simply returns an agent object that follows a
policy determined by applying the chromosome rules in order,
as also described in section IV-B.
fitness returns the average score of the agent after playing
100 matches in self-play mode. While these matches are
played, a number of statistics can be recorded, such as the
number of hints given, the number of turns where a hint token
was available, the total number of cards played and how many
pieces of information was known about each played card.
niches calculates the Communicativeness and IPP values
based on these stored statistics, and converts these behavior
metrics (which take values between 0 and 1) into two integer
indexes, according to how many niches each metric’s range is
divided into. In our case, we divided each metric in 20 equally-
sized parts, so a Communicativeness value between 0 and
0.05 corresponds to the first niche on the Communicativeness
dimension, a value between 0.05 and 0.1 to the second and so
on, until the last niche corresponding to values between 0.95
and 1.
After that, the program checks whether an elite has already
been assigned to the corresponding entry Ai,j . If that entry
is empty, the chromosome of the current agent is stored in
that cell. Otherwise, we re-calculate the fitness of the elite in
Ai,j by instantiating its corresponding agent and computing
its average score over 100 games, with the same random seed
as used to play the games involved.
We do this rather than simply storing the elite’s fitness value
because an agent’s fitness is obtained through a stochastic
process, so it would be possible to overestimate an elite’s
fitness if it simply had an unusually lucky set of games,
making it too hard for future generations to replace.
V. MAP-ELITES RESULTS
A. Self-play Scores
We used Map-Elites to generate and evaluate agents by ex-
ecuting three separate runs of algorithm 1. Each run generated
and evaluated a total of 106 candidate individuals and recorded
the chromosome of the elite in each of the 400 behavioral
niches where a score greater than zero was achieved. A run’s
coverage is defined as the number of niches successfully filled
by an elite in the run.
While during evolution each individual’s fitness was es-
timated by playing one hundred games, after evolution we
reevaluated each elite by playing a thousand self-play games.
Table I shows the maximum self-play score of any elite in
each run during this re-evaluation, the average self-play score
of agents in all covered niches and each run’s coverage.
All three runs had very similar coverage of either 310 or 311
out of 400. The mean score over covered niches was also very
similar from run to run, with an average of 10.04 across the
three runs. The score of the best agent in each run varied from
19.99 to 20.43. Across all 932 agents, the average Standard
Deviation (SD) of their score was 2.71 and the maximum
SD of the score of any agent was 7.15, corresponding to a
Fig. 1. Main results of the MAP-Elites experiment after reevaluating each elite in each run for 1000 games each. Values represent the fitness (score) of the
best individual in that niche, with redder entries corresponding to higher scores. The maximum score for each run is highlighted in blue.
Run # Candidates Max Score Average Score Coverage
Run 1 1000000 20.43 10.02 311
Run 2 1000000 19.99 9.99 311
Run 3 1000000 20.31 10.11 310
TABLE I
NUMBER OF CANDIDATES GENERATED, SELF-PLAY SCORE OF THE BEST
PERFORMING ELITE, AVERAGE SCORE (OVER COVERED NICHES) AND
COVERAGE OF EACH OF THE THREE RUNS. THE HIGHEST S.E.M. OF ANY
OF THE 932 AGENT’S SCORE IS 0.23.
maximum Standard Error of the Mean (S.E.M.) of 0.23 with
1000 matches played.
Figure 1 shows the fitness of the elite in all 400 niches
of each run. The three runs showed a very similar fitness
landscape, with highest scores concentrated in the region
with high values of both Communicativeness and IPP (upper
right of each graph). The region with high IPP, but low
Communicativeness were largely not covered by any agent
scoring over 0 in self-play (bottom right of the graphs). An
agent in this region would rarely give hints, yet only play cards
it knows a lot of information about. In self-play, such agent
would never give enough hints to its partner to satisfy their
high IPP requirement and would thus score zero.
Note that, while the well-performing agents have high
values for both behavior metrics, the best agent in each run
was not found at the extreme of either metric. In run 1, the
best agent was at the niche centered around (0.725,0.525),
corresponding to IPP between 0.7 and 0.75 and Communica-
tiveness between 0.5 and 0.55. This agent had an average self-
play score of 20.43. For runs 2 and 3, the niche of the best
agent was centered around (0.775,0.575) and (0.725,0.575),
with scores of 19.99 and 20.33 respectively. The score of the
best agent in runs 1 and 3 are an improvement over our best 2-
player agent (called Mirror Situational) reported in [13], which
had a reported self-play score of 20.07.
B. Diversity between runs
One of our goals with this work is to address the issues of
reproducibility related to the choice of the pool A as described
in section III-B by generating this pool in a stochastic way,
offering a middle-ground between a public pool and a secret
one. This requires our agents to not only be diverse within the
population generated by a single run, but also that the agents
be reasonably diverse from run to run.
We evaluated this by comparing what we call “correspond-
ing pairs” from the three runs. These are the pairs of elites that
occupy the same niche in any two different runs. We performed
experiments measuring how well these corresponding agents
play together, how similar their chromosomes are and how
similar the action they take are (given the same game-state).
For the first measurement, we simulated 1000 2-player
games between each corresponding pair. There are 311 cor-
responding pairs between runs 1 and 2, 310 pairs between
runs 1 and 3 and 310 pairs between runs 2 and 3 (due to
the slightly smaller coverage of run 3). Table II shows the
results of this experiment. For each niche, we call the score
of a corresponding pair between two runs that pair’s cross-
play score. On average, the cross-play score was 10.02 across
all pairs in the three runs. It is useful to compare that number
with the average self-play score of agents in all the 3 runs
(10.04). This means pairs of corresponding agents performed,
on average, about as well with each other as they perform on
self-play.
This might be an indication that these agents are in fact
too similar from run to run. To test that, we compared
their chromosomes directly. For each pair, we computed the
Hamming distance [28] between each agent’s chromosomes.
Each chromosome was represented by 15 genes, each gene
mapping to one of 135 possible rules. We computed the
average Hamming distance to be 14.26, meaning each pair
of chromosomes shared, on average, fewer than 1 rule in the
same position.
While the chromosomes are very different, it would still
be possible that the agents exhibited very similar behavior
(phenotype) despite the distance between their genotypes.
To account for that, we investigated how often two agents
from different populations that occupy the same niche take
the same actions, if given the same game state. We did this
by first playing 10 self-play games with each of the agents
of population 1 and recording each game state, for a total
of 149611 game states. Then, for each of these game states,
and for each of the 310 niches where all runs of the MAP-
Elites algorithm produced a valid elite, we verified whether
Run 1 2 3
1 10.02 9.95 10.02
2 - 9.99 10.10
3 - - 10.11
TABLE II
CROSS-PLAY SCORE OF PAIRS OF CORRESPONDING AGENTS IN EACH RUN.
THE DIAGONAL IS THE SAME AS THE SELF-PLAY SCORES REPORTED IN
TABLE I. THE HIGHEST S.E.M. OF THE ANY OF THE 931 INDIVIDUAL
PAIRINGS IS 0.23
the two corresponding agents from two different populations
take the same action. On average, these corresponding pairs
took the same action on 62% of the game states we analysed.
Considering there are up to 20 legal actions per game state
(and an average of 13 legal actions), this is a much higher
similarity than one would expect between two completely
uncorrelated agents, but not enough to perfectly predict an
agent’s next play based solely on their niche.
In our previous paper [4] we also measured the similarity
of the chromosomes and actions of agents within each run.
We found that agents close to each other on the behavior map
(figure 1) had similar chromosomes and chose similar actions,
but agents further away from each other were more dissimilar.
For space considerations, we omit these experiments here.
VI. THE META-AGENT
Next, we want to leverage the populations of diverse agents
we generated to create more general agents for Ad-Hoc
teamplay. In the Future Work section of our previous paper [4],
we suggested an approach for building an adaptive agent based
on identifying its partner’s behavioral metrics and selecting an
appropriate pre-computed strategy based on that behavior. We
call this approach a meta-agent, since it attempts to select,
during gameplay, a policy it estimates to work well with the
current partner. We now describe this approach in more detail.
A. Offline training
During offline training, the agent must compute:
• A policy that maximizes the score with randomly sampled
partners from the pool. We call this the generalist policy,
and the meta-agent follows this policy if it is too uncertain
about the behavioral metrics of its partner.
• For each region of the behavior space, a policy that plays
well with partners from that region. We call each of these
a specialized policy, to be used when the meta-agent
estimates its partner’s behavioral metrics to fall within
that region.
Note that in principle, we could use any algorithm to
generate a generalist or specialized policy. In our initial
experiments, however, we select these policies from among
the populations generated by MAP-Elites. We do this by first
running 300 games between each pair of agents in a population
and recording the corresponding average score. We call each
pair of agents a match-up.
Then, we choose the generalist policy to be the policy of
the agent that achieves the best average score across all of its
match-ups, and the specialized policy for each niche as the
policy of the agent who achieves the best score when paired
with the agent in that niche.
More formally, let A be a (two-dimensional) population
of agents. If we let score(Ai,j , Am,n) represent the expected
score of the match-up between agents in positions (i, j) and
(m,n) in A, we can define an agent’s intra-population score
to be:
intra(Ai,j) =
1
||A||
∑
m,n
score(Ai,j , Am,n) (1)
Where ||A|| is the number of valid agents in A (that
population’s coverage). Then, if we denote by (iG, jG) the
indexes of the generalist policy, it follows that
(iG, jG) = argmax
i,j
(intra(Ai,j)) (2)
And the specialized policy (or specialized response) for
niche (m,n) is given by the agent with indexes
(im,n, jm,n) = argmax
i,j
(score(Ai,j , Am,n)) (3)
We call the collection of specialized policies and their
indexes a response table, since they let us pick, for any index
(m,n) displayed by a partner, the index (im,n, jm,n) of the
best response to that partner in A.
B. Ad-Hoc Adaptation
When faced with an ad-hoc partner, the meta-agent attempts
to estimate that partner’s niches, potentially across many
games, and makes a simple decision at each of its turns:
• If the meta-agent is not confident about its partner’s
behavioral niche, it chooses actions following generalist
policy.
• If the meta-agent is confident that its partner belongs to
a certain behavioral niche, it chooses actions following
the specialized policy given by the response table to that
niche.
Algorithm 2 shows a pseudocode of this process, assuming
estimateNiches returns the estimated niches and some mea-
sure of confidence in this estimation, and getAction returns
the action taken by an agent in a given state.
Algorithm 2: Meta-Agent Action Selection
Input: a game state state, a generalist strategy G, a
response table R, a history of interactions with the
current partner H , a threshold of confidence C.
Output: the action a to take at the current state
niches, confidence← estimateNiches(H);
if confidence > C then
a← getAction(G, state)
else
specialist← R[niches]
a← getAction(specialist, state)
return a
In order to this, the meta-agent needs to record information
about its partner. In theory, the whole history of moves and
game-states could be recorded, but for our purposes we need
only to record enough information to reconstruct the metrics
we’re interested in (e.g. for Communicativeness, the number
of hints given and the number of turns with a hint token) and
to determine whether we’re confident enough to switch from
the generalist to the specialized policy.
In our experiment, we use a simple threshold to decide
whether to make this switch: if the number of turns played
with a certain partner exceeds a fixed threshold, we follow the
specialized policy to that partner’s apparent niche. Otherwise,
we follow the generalist policy.
For our experiments, all information about a partner persists
between games. This is accomplished by providing the meta-
agent with a dummy ID for its current partner at the start
of each game. This ID contains no information of strategic
importance, but is consistent across games for each partner.
This corresponds to the scenario implemented in the Learning
Track of the CoG competition [9]. We can also disable this
ID if we want the meta-agent to adapt only over the course of
a single game (which corresponds to the Mixed track of the
competition).
The success of this meta-strategy rest on two assumptions,
which we make explicit here:
1) That a policy that performs well with agents occupying
a given niche in our population will also work well with
arbitrary agents (outside that population) that happen to
occupy the same niche.
2) That it is possible to correctly identify the behavior niche
of a partner during gameplay.
Our choice for using average information per play rather
than risk aversion as one of our behavioral dimensions can
be seen as a step to fulfill assumption 2, since risk-aversion
requires estimating the probability that each card is playable,
which depends on information our agent will not have access
to during game-play (the contents of its own hand).
C. Experimental Set-Up
We implemented three variations of the meta-agent for
evaluation purposes:
• An oracle meta-agent, which is given the correct behav-
ioral niche of its partner by a black box module outside
the game, and follows the corresponding specialized
policy on the response table.
• A generalist meta-agent, which always follows the gen-
eralist policy. This is equivalent to setting the threshold
to infinite.
• An adaptive meta-agent, which calculates its partner’s
perceived behavior metrics and always chooses the cor-
responding specialized response. This corresponds to
setting the threshold to zero.
We initially also attempted to set the threshold to other
intermediate values, but the agent’s performance after reaching
the threshold did not vary much for different choices of
threshold. For this reason, we restricted ourselves initially to
the two extreme values.
We instantiated each of these three meta-agents using the
generalist policy and response table from each of the three
populations generated by MAP-Elites (for a total of 9 in-
stances). We then evaluated each of these instances by playing
1000 games with each agent for each of the 3 populations (for
a total of 27 different experiments).
When evaluating a meta-agent with the same population
it was trained with, the oracle and generalist agents serve
as a sanity check, as their expected scores can be directly
calculated from the match-up data gathered during training.
The oracle also acts as an upper bound to the performance of
the adaptive agent since, in the best case scenario, the meta-
agent will arrive at the same specialized policy as the oracle.
The gap in performance between the oracle and the generalist
represents the maximum theoretical improvement to be gained
by adapting to an appropriate response strategy rather than
following a strategy that simply works well on average across
all agents. If the adaptive meta-agent manages to achieve better
performance than the generalist, it means that this adaptative
meta-strategy is paying off in a practical scenario where the
niches aren’t given.
When evaluating a meta-agent with a population other than
the one it was trained with, our objective is to verify to what
extent strategies that work for one niche in a certain population
also work well for the same niche in a different population.
In other words, these experiments verify whether assumption
1 stated in section VI-B holds for this pair of populations.
VII. META-AGENT RESULTS
A. Training Results
To train our meta-agent, we had each agent in the 3 different
populations play 400 games with all other agents in the same
population. In a population with n covered niches, there are a
total of n2/2 possible match-ups, including each agent paired
with itself, for a total of 400∗n2/2 games per population. For
each of these match-ups, we record the mean score achieved by
that pair of agents. For each agent, we computed their average
score across all match-ups, (the intra-population score defined
in equation 1). The agent with the highest score constitutes
our generalist policy for that population (equation 2). We also
computed the best score across all of an agent’s match-up,
and the indexes of the partner corresponding to that match-
up, which makes for the specialized policy for that niche
(equation 3).
We call the collection specialized policies for all niches
the response table. One way to visualize this table is as
a collection of line segments on the 2-D plane, mapping
the niche (m,n) at one end to its corresponding specialized
response (im,n, jm,n). Figure 2 shows this visualization for
each of the three population. In each graph, every line segment
has a blue endpoint, representing a niche, and a red endpoint,
representing its specialized response. The niche of the general-
ist strategy is circled in black. Note that this is not necessarily
the niche with the highest number of red endpoints, but the
Fig. 2. Visualization of a response table based on populations 1, 2 and 3, from left to right. The blue endpoint of each line segment represents the elite
in each niche, and the red endpoint the specialized response to that agent. The circles around (0.825, 0.425), (0.925, 0.475) and (0.825, 0.475) represent the
generalist strategy which performs best on average across all pairings in its respective population. Gridlines are omitted so as not to occlude the line segments.
niche with the highest mean score when paired with all the
agents in the population.
Note also that the high self-play performance (red) regions
of the behavior space shown in figure 1 correspond roughly to
the location of the generalist agent and with the regions with
higher concentration of red endpoints in figure 2. This suggests
that, in general, agents with good self-play performance are
also strong when paired with other agents.
However, in all three graphs there are also clusters of
red endpoints outside this high-performing region. In par-
ticular, all three graphs have a number of red endpoints at
or very close to maximum Communicativeness, and their
corresponding blue terminations are typically outside the high-
performing region. We hypothesize that agents in that high-
performing region use mostly similar strategies based on some
reasonable assumptions of playability, but agents outside that
region, especially agents with IPP ≤ 0.5 tend to play cards
“recklessly”, whether or not they have information, but still
take information into account if it is available. Agents with
extreme Communicativeness, which almost never skip a hint,
would make ideal partners to these reckless agents.
B. Evaluation Results
Table III shows the results of our evaluations of the meta-
agent. The average scores for the Oracle, Generalist and
Adaptive agent were, respectively, 12.99, 12.25 and 10.37
when evaluated with the same populations they were trained
on (underlined entries in the table) and 12.72, 12.04 and 10.35
when evaluated with all agents from all populations.
The gap of around 0.7 point between the Oracle and
Generalist scores suggests that there’s a potentially significant
benefit for correctly choosing a specialized strategy for each
partner rather than a generalist strategy. However, the larger
gap between the Generalist and Adaptive scores shows that
our Adaptive agent falls short of benefiting from this potential
adaptation, and one would be better off using the generalist
strategy than trying to adapt with our current method.
As we mentioned in section VI-B, the success of the adap-
tive meta-strategy rested on the assumptions that the choice
of the correct adaptive policy is relatively consistent across
populations and that we can correctly identify the behavior
of a partner during gameplay. For the agents evaluated with
their own respective training populations (underlined entries in
table III), the first assumption holds by default, representing
an easier scenario for the adaptive agent. Since even on this
scenario the Generalist agents significantly outperformed the
Adaptive agents, we proceeded to investigate assumption 2,
that is, whether the Adaptive agents were correctly identifying
its partner’s niches.
We investigated this by taking Adaptive1, and having it
output at the end of the experiment its estimate for the
Communicativeness and IPP scores of its partner, based on
the information it stored across all games.
What we found is that, across all 311 partners, the agent’s
mean absolute error in estimating Communicativeness was
0.11, and the absolute error in estimating IPP was 0.27. The
mean signed error for these two measurements were -0.07 and
-0.20, respectively, meaning that the agent was, on average,
underestimating the both behavior metrics of its partner. Since
each niche has length 0.05 in each dimension, this means the
agent is not assigning the correct niche to its partner most of
the time.
We speculate that this is caused by the fact that an agent’s
behavior isn’t specified fully by its own preferences on when
to play or hint a card, but also on the actions performed
by its partners, which influence the agent’s decisions. This
would lead to an agent’s perceived Communicativeness and
IPP to vary drastically between the self-play and ad-hoc
play scenarios. Since our Adaptive agent’s responses are pre-
computed based on behavior values measured in self-play, this
would lead to not choosing the proper response strategy in the
ad-hoc setting.
As an example of how these behavior metrics might differ
from self-play to ad-hoc play, consider a hypothetical agent
that has some fixed criteria for “likely playability” of a card,
and which immediately plays any card deemed likely enough.
This agent’s IPP in a game would depend on how effective
its partner’s hints are at establishing playability based on this
criteria. However, an arbitrary partner would give different
hints than the agent itself would at self-play, so the displayed
IPP values would also be different.
Evaluation population
Agent Population 1 Population 2 Population 3
Oracle1 12.84 12.60 12.48
Oracle2 12.60 13.11 12.68
Oracle3 12.49 12.71 13.01
Generalist1 12.12 12.26 12.19
Generalist2 11.75 12.16 11.94
Generalist3 11.68 11.77 12.48
Adaptive1 10.08 9.98 9.85
Adaptive2 10.51 10.47 10.42
Adaptive3 10.67 10.62 10.57
TABLE III
RESULTS OF VALIDATIONS WITH META-AGENT. THE UNDERLINED
ENTRIES REPRESENT AGENTS THAT WERE TRAINED AND EVALUATED
WITH THE SAME POPULATION
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we described our method for generating
diverse populations of agents with MAP-Elites using Com-
municativeness and information per play (IPP) as behavior
metrics. We also described a meta-heuristic agent that attempts
to adapt during gameplay by using a pre-computed response
table indicating which strategy to use when paired with agents
in each behavioral niche.
Our results suggest that if the meta-agent is able to correctly
identify its partner’s niche (as is the case in the Oracle
scenarios), it can perform better than if it were to just follow
a non-adaptive generalist strategy that maximizes expected
performance against a uniform sample of all agents. However,
in practice, the meta-agent performs worse than this generalist
strategy because it can’t correctly identify its partner’s niche.
The underlying problem we discovered is to be that an
agent’s behavior, as captured by our metrics, depends on its
partner’s behavior. By attempting to measure their behavior
during gameplay, we might play in a way as to alter their
behavior, interfering with the measurement.
The immediate follow-up question we would like to inves-
tigate, then, is how to characterize another agent’s behavior
during gameplay in a way that avoids this problem. Compar-
ison between the error of estimation of Communicativeness
and PIP suggests that some behavior metrics might be more
robust to this effect than others, so a possibilty would be to
come up with metrics that don’t vary as much based on the
differences between our own behavior and our partner’s self-
play behavior. Another possibility would be for the meta-agent
to attempt to “triangulate” its partner’s behavior by attempting
to play various strategies and keeping track of their behavioral
response to each strategy.
As another avenue for research, the first assumption dis-
cussed in section VI-B rests upon how much variation there is
within each niche for agents that are not part of our training
population. Some of our results touch on this issue, such as
our metrics for diversity between runs in section V-B and
the experiments with meta-agents using a different pool for
training and evaluation (non-underlined entries in table III).
However, more research in necessary, including analysing the
response patterns in figure 2 to verify how much variation there
is in the best response across runs. It would also be interesting
to compare the pools generated by the current iteration of the
MAP-Elites algorithms, using a rule-based representation, to
pools generated by other methods of generating agents, such
as reinforcement learning and neuroevolution [29].
Finally, it would be interesting to verify whether our char-
acterization of Hanabi players based on the behavior metrics
described in this paper is useful to describe the behavior of
human players. Some questions we would like to address
are: what niches are predominantly occupied by humans? Do
our current behavior metrics capture the variations of play
exhibited by humans? Is there a behavioral region that plays
best with humans? Do the answers to these questions depend
on a particular human’s skill level or some other factor? Data
could be gathered from new experiments addressing these
questions or from from previous studies involving human
players such as [7], [21], [23].
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